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Is the Nordic welfare model viable?
21
st
 century challenges to the Nordic welfare model in 
a European context
 Jon Kvist※
The discussion of the viability of the Nordic welfare model in many ways 
resembles the scientific discussion of the bumblebee. The bumblebee, as we know, 
flies against the laws of nature and against scientists’ insight into these laws. 
Similarly the welfare state persists despite predictions by many social scientists 
that it will go under as a result of its own excellence. Because the Nordic welfare 
model is supposedly more universal and generous than other European welfare 
models, it is also expected to become extinct earlier and more rapidly than its 
European counterparts. In particular seven factors have been listed as leading to 
the extinction of the Nordic welfare model, i.e. globalization, Europeanization, 
changing structures in the family and the labour market, a changing age 
composition, old and new social problems, and the popularity of the welfare state. 
Most of these challenges are general to welfare states, but sometimes the Nordic 
welfare model is portrayed as having more reason for concern than other 
European welfare models.
In this chapter we examine these challenges to the Nordic welfare model. 
After presenting some of the main features of the model in relation to other 
European welfare models, we consider the alleged overwhelming challenges. This 
provides a background for assessing whether the days of the Nordic welfare model 
are numbered, whether it is moving closer to other European welfare models, or if 
this model will still be socially and economically viable in the twenty-first century.
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What is the Nordic welfare model?
It is sometimes difficult to identify a single common Nordic model across the 
individual welfare policy programmes, but at a general level the Nordic welfare 
model is characterized by:
Being all-embracing. The state has great social responsibility vis-à-vis the market 
and civil society. This is reflected in comprehensive public policies.
Universalism. In a wide range of social events and life situations, the population 
has basic social rights in the form of benefits in kind (services) and cash 
(transfers).
Individualism. Social rights are in large measure individualized - that is, benefits 
are to a significant extent allocated and assessed in relation to an individual’s 
situation with no regard to the rest of the family (benefits for families with 
children and social assistance are exceptions to this).
The goal of high employment. Policies aim to contribute to full employment and to 
combat unemployment, especially long-term unemployment.
The goal of equality of opportunity and results. Policies often seek to contribute to 
increased equality between different groups based on gender, age, class, 
family situation, ethnicity, regions, etc.
High quality and generosity. Services are of high quality, and those employed in 
the social, health and education sectors are well educated and trained. Social 
security is relatively generous for low-income groups to enable a “normal” 
standard of living.
Most services are locally organized, provided by the municipality. Intra-Nordic 
differences are seen in the financing, with Denmark having a larger share of tax 
financing that the other countries, where social security contributions make up a 
larger part of the financing. This description concerns the ideal type of the Nordic 
welfare model in the sense that none of the countries fits the model exactly. The 
degree to which the countries conform to the ideal type of the Nordic welfare 
model varies between different fields and through time; the model is a heuristic 
device for identifying distinctive Nordic features and a yardstick to measure how 
far the actual situation and development in individual countries and fields 
conforms to or departs from the outlined model (Kangas 1994; Kvist 1999; Kangas 
& Kvist 2012).
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The Nordic welfare model stands in contrast to the other two ideal types of 
welfare models in Western Europe, the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental 
European models. To underline the different historical-institutional development 
of the models and the underlying political ideologies, the Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, 
and Continental European models are often called, respectively, social democratic, 
liberal, and conservative welfare regimes (see e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). 
Germany is often taken as the best examplar country of the Continental 
European model and the United Kingdom as the best European examplar country 
of the Anglo-Saxon country, although the United States is indeed the best 
representative country of the Liberal welfare model.
One might easily be led to believe that the Nordic welfare model is more 
expensive than the other models; the claim is frequently heard that the model is 
too costly and untenable in the long term. Yet this is a myth. Spending on welfare 
is equally large in all three models but the composition of public and private 
expenditures differ as does taxation. As can be seen in Column 1 in Table 1 the 
Nordic countries and Germany representing the Continental European model, do 
have higher gross public expenditure than does the United Kingdom and, 
especially, the United States, representing the Anglo-Saxon model. Norway is the 
exception with gross public expenditures on level with the United Kingdom.
Table 1.   From gross public to total net social spending, social expenditure in 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product at market prices, 2007
Gross public
 expenditure (1)
Net public mandated 
expenditure (2)
Net social 
expenditure (3)
Denmark 26.0 20.1 21.4
Finland 24.9 20.0 20.7
Norway 20.8 17.1 18.3
Sweden 27.3 21.8 23.6
Germany 25.2 23.5 25.1
United Kingdom 20.5 19.4 23.7
United States 16.2 17.8 25.6
Japan 18.7 18.2 21.6
Source: OECD (2012).
However, if we consider the different national tax systems and include “private” 
welfare arrangements, the expenditure on social purposes in the Nordic countries 
are slightly lower than those in countries with a Continental European welfare 
model such as Germany, and does not even exceed the level of spending in 
countries with an Anglo-Saxon welfare model such as the United Kingdom and 
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the United States (for a social policy discussion of the traditionally “hidden” parts 
of the welfare state, see Kvist & Sinfield 1996). In the Nordic countries most 
social security benefits and social assistance is taxed as other income, thus 
resulting not only in government outlays but also in revenue to the state. When 
including this taxation of benefits, tax expenditures and mandated social 
expenditures the expenditure levels of the Nordic countries is markedly reduced 
as can be seen in Column 2 of Table 1. Including also non-mandated programmes, 
i.e. private schemes, significantly increase the levels of social expenditures in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, as can be seen in Column 3 of Table 1. In short, it is 
therefore not the net social expenditures, but only the gross public social 
expenditures that are higher in Scandinavia than elsewhere.
In comparison with Japan the Nordic countries have higher gross public 
expenditures. The difference in expenditures becomes smaller when comparing 
net public mandated expenditures. The difference disappears when comparing net 
social expenditures. Only Sweden has higher net social expenditures than Japan, 
see Column 3 of Table 1.
The differences between the three welfare models lie not in the consumption 
of welfare but rather concern who pays for and who receives welfare benefits. 
There are pronounced differences in the roles played in welfare by the state 
(public authorities), civil society (especially the family) and the market (primarily 
the labour market); this is known as the welfare mix. There is likewise a great 
difference in the goals, orientation, and consequences of welfare policy. The 
situation in the Nordic model has been presented above. In the Continental 
European model the state maintains the status that employees have attained in 
the labour market when they are affected by a social event, whereas the family is 
responsible for care. Transfers are generous for insiders, whereas groups with a 
weaker link to the labour market have less favourable coverage. The scope of 
public care services is relatively limited, since such services are in large measure 
left to the family, to voluntary organizations, and to the church.
The state is envisaged as having a much smaller role in the Anglo-Saxon 
model, where the aim is primarily to alleviate temporary poverty, and individuals 
themselves are supposed to arrange their own welfare and that of the family. The 
benefits are therefore aimed at people in economic need and groups of supposedly 
deserving poor. That is why the benefits are earmarked for special needs and are 
scaled down in relation to income and means. Compared to benefits in the other 
models, public transfer incomes (e.g. unemployment benefit) are much less 
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generous, but they are often supplemented with other benefits (e.g. housing 
allowance). The scope of services, for example, for children and old people, is 
limited, as the family has the main responsibility for both provision and care 
without further help from the state. Instead, voluntary organizations and charity 
play a part. Privileged people in these societies insure themselves by private 
arrangements which are supported by state subsidies via the tax system.
Two essential differences between these welfare models concern who is 
covered and how. In the Nordic model the entire population is entitled to benefits 
in both kind and cash, whereas in the Continental European model it is mainly 
the insiders who receive income protection through social insurance, and in the 
Anglo-Saxon model it is only special groups among the “deserving poor” (primarily 
people incapable of working and single mothers) and people in temporary 
economic need that are supported through social assistance type schemes. The 
Nordic welfare model thus differs from the two other models by having more 
numerous and more all-encompassing services, by having social security aimed at 
more universal coverage than the Continental European model and by more 
generous benefits than the Anglo-Saxon model.
The observant reader may have noticed the lack of a distinct Central and 
Eastern European welfare model representing those European countries that got 
independence from Soviet dominance in 1990. In rough terms these countries 
have different mixes of the social insurance heavy scheme of the Continental 
European model and the service heavy model of the Nordic countries, albeit 
generally less generous benefit levels and less encompassing scope of application.
We will now examine alleged challenges to the contemporary welfare state 
and discuss the far-reaching consequences of such differences, on the one hand, 
for the opportunities of different population groups to pursue an education, to find 
work and to form a family and, on the other hand, for the economic and social 
viability of the Nordic welfare model.
Challenges of the 21st century
The welfare state is pivotal to the Nordic welfare model and has always faced 
insurmountable challenges or crises, if we are to believe the political rhetoric, the 
media, and the academic literature. However, the diagnosis of the challenges has 
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changed over time (for a survey see Jæger & Kvist 2000). In the past it was the 
welfare state itself that was seen as the reason for many of the great challenges to 
the Western welfare state. According to many economists, the welfare state led to 
lower economic growth and higher inflation, and hence to reduced prosperity. For 
example, the welfare state was accused of decreasing people’s incentive to work, of 
artificially pushing wages upwards, resulting in increased unemployment and 
insufficient economic activity. It has been difficult, however, to find supporting 
empirical evidence for such hypotheses (see e.g. Atkinson & Mogensen 1993), and 
historically there are no signs that a well-developed welfare state like the Nordic 
welfare model leads to a systematic erosion of the welfare society.
The definitions of the new challenges therefore differ from yesterday’s by not 
regarding the welfare state as the key institution causing the greatest challenge 
to a welfare society. The seven great challenges we will examine are all based on 
changes in systems outside the welfare state: globalization, Europeanization, 
changed labour market structures, new family types, demographic changes, old 
and new social problems, and the popularity of the welfare state (see Table 2).
Also we will shortly look at how the exogenous shock posed by the current 
global financial crisis may impact on the Nordic welfare model. Globalization is 
especially linked to the market as a system, while Europeanization mainly 
concerns the political system. The other challenges arise from civil society as a 
system. In the following sections we examine how different welfare models are 
able to meet these challenges with the focus on the social and economic viability 
of the Nordic welfare model and the welfare of its citizens.
Globalization
The world is getting smaller. Progress in modern technology means that 
resources, goods, and capital all cross borders more quickly and cheaply than ever. 
This economic integration is a potential financial threat to  especially the 
financing of the welfare state. Is it possible to maintain existing levels of taxation 
and levies on mobile things such as commodities, services, and companies, or will 
nation states enter fiscal competition or a “race to the bottom”? Nation states in 
fiscal competition reduce taxes and duties in order to attract companies, or keep 
them in the country, and to ensure that products and services are not sold from 
one country to another, for example, via the Internet or cross-border trade. This 
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means reduced revenue and hence either an undermining of the finance and 
benefits of the welfare state or else a shift to increased taxes on other objects.
Since labour generally is not as mobile as products and companies, one 
solution might be to move some of the financing from products and companies to 
labour. Yet this is not a viable approach either. Global economic integration may 
mean increased incentives to reduce production costs in order to improve 
competitiveness. This would trigger a latent pressure to reduce wages as well as 
taxes and social contributions for employees and employers, and to deregulate the 
conditions governing employment (work environment, job security, etc.).
Table 2. Challenges to the Nordic welfare model and possible reactions
Challenge Examples Possible reactions
Globalization Fiscal competition
Social dumping
Brain drain
Establishment of minimum levels for taxes, 
social rights, and working conditions
Competion for a good social and economic 
infrastructure
Europeanization Social tourism
Political integration
Social dumping
See above
Changing labour 
market
Women’s increased 
labour market 
participation
Less labour market 
participation among the 
younger and older parts 
of the workforce
Greater demands of 
flexibility and 
qualifications on the 
workforce
Insecure (low-paid) jobs
Marginalization traps
Continued facilitation of combined work 
and family life, e.g. through extensive 
subsidized child care, flexible arrangements 
for leave etc.
Encouraging the older part of the workforce 
to remain longer in the labour market by 
adjusting the social and tax systems and by 
improving working conditions
Lifelong learning through increased use of 
adult education, in-service training, and 
labour market training
Competition through the qualifications of 
the workforce rather than pay and working 
conditions
Improved efforts for the long-term 
unemployed with the emphasis on raising 
qualifications
Changing family Growth of atypical 
families (especially lone 
parents, cohabiting 
families)
Promoting participation in social life, 
including the labour market
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Changing 
demographics
Longer life
More old people
Fewer in gainful 
employment
More ethnic minorities
More training of social workers to promote 
career opportunities, increase productivity, 
and attract necessary staff
Increased opportunities for further 
participation in the labour market after 
retirement age
Reduced public support for early retirement 
for privileged groups
Visible and all-round prioritization of 
service measures for old people
Intensified work on the integration of 
ethnic minorities, e.g. in child care, school, 
housing policy, and labour market policy, 
including training of social workers to 
handle cultural issues
Old and new 
social problems
Social inheritance
Exclusion
Marginalization
Improved quality of child care and 
education services
Earlier and perhaps more comprehensive 
family interventions
Continued social and labour market 
measures for vulnerable groups
The popularity 
of the welfare 
state
Continued demands for 
more and better benefits
The new politics of the 
welfare state
Changed priorities in public benefits, e.g. 
from old to young and from certain types of 
transfers to services
Financial cirisis Sovereign risk premiums Increase of retirement ages through 
reduction of early exit schemes and increase 
of legal retirement ages in line with 
increases in longevity
Increasing rates of returns on social 
expenditure by directing these toward 
human capital investments, i.e. social 
investments
This kind of social dumping in the form of competition over wages and working 
conditions can be envisaged as reducing the revenue base of the welfare state and 
potentially contributing to greater social problems. At the same time, high 
taxation of labour entails a risk of brain drain, as people with high-paid jobs seek 
work abroad. This would lead to a loss of jobs, since those who leave are assumed 
to be the engines or job generators in economic development.
Whether economic integration leads to fiscal competition, social dumping and 
brain drain depends partly on the actual development in taxes on goods, services, 
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companies, private individuals, and working conditions and wages, and partly on 
the actual behaviour of consumers, companies, and employees, especially their 
inclination to buy things in or move to another country with lower taxes and 
duties. Total welfare consumption, as we have seen, is similar even in countries 
with different welfare models. For the vast majority of Nordic employees, the level 
of personal taxation is no higher than in other countries, when one includes 
contributions to general taxes, social insurance arrangements, and private 
arrangements for social purposes.
For the highest-paid people there are still differences in marginal taxation, 
which could result in some brain drain from the Nordic countries. In the last 40 
years, however, the Nordic countries have both lost and gained labour with no 
great consequences for public revenue. Similarly, the levels of company taxation 
and job protection are not prohibitively high in the Nordic countries by 
international standards and many international corporations establish 
themselves in Scandinavia. The strategy of deregulation and wage flexibility has 
not been followed in Scandinavia, but primarily in countries with the Anglo-Saxon 
welfare model. The result has not been just high employment, but also low-paid 
jobs, inequality, poverty and insecurity. In some Continental European countries 
with high job protection and contribution-financed arrangements, recent reforms, 
for example in France and Germany, have shifted some of the financing from 
social contributions to general taxation, and the Netherlands has reduced its job 
protection.
All industrialised countries, whatever their welfare model, have reduced tax 
rates and extended the tax base in the last 25 years. This tendency will probably 
continue for a few years to come, so it is important to minimize any 
disadvantageous consequences for the Nordic welfare model. To avoid fiscal 
competition, the Nordic countries could seek a certain degree of coordination in 
tax policy with the EU, with the establishment of minimum rates for corporate 
taxation (Birch Sørensen 2000), increases in the taxation of immobile objects such 
as land and housing, and energy and environmental consumption. To avoid social 
dumping, states could try to establish minimum standards for social rights and 
working conditions.
Globalization not only affects the financing of the welfare state, however, but 
also strengthens the demand for a flexible and well-qualified workforce. On this 
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point there are perhaps, as we discuss below, some advantages in the Nordic drive 
for an active state with comprehensive services, compared to the situation in 
countries with other welfare model see also Kvist 2011).
Europeanization
In the Nordic countries, it is often claimed that cooperation within the EU will 
lead to a dismantling or a fundamental change of the Nordic welfare model. Since 
the welfare systems of the other EU countries are based on differing principles of 
redistribution, organization, and financing, it is supposed that we must inevitably 
adjust our own system to this. There is broad agreement in comparative research 
on welfare states that the three welfare models are the result of the countries’ 
different historical-institutional background, such as the role of the church, two 
world wars, demographic development, and – last but not least – the political 
struggle between different parties and ideologies (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Stjernø 1995). There is also agreement that it is neither the EC nor the EU that 
has been a driving factor in the development of welfare policy in Scandinavia or 
elsewhere. Likewise, empirical studies of recent developments in social policy 
have not shown that the EU has made any difference. Denmark has been member 
of the EU since 1973, Finland and Sweden since 1996 and Norway is not member 
of the EU. Denmark ’s longer period of membership have not led to the 
dismantling of the Danish welfare model, nor has Denmark moved away from the 
other Nordic countries. Finnish and Swedish social policy has also not been 
dismantled or “Europeanized” since they joined the EU (but see Kvist and Saari 
2007).
There is no systematic difference between the Nordic countries inside and 
outside the EU. There are however systematic differences both in the actual 
distribution of welfare, including equality between men and women, and in the 
welfare policy that follows the three welfare models (Kautto et al. 2001). 
Membership of the EU is thus not synonymous with membership of a specific 
welfare model. Even EU-sceptical politicians in Denmark have concluded that 
“the EU has not reduced Danish welfare and will scarcely make any concrete 
proposals to reduce it in the future” (Villy Søvndal, chairman of the 
Parliamentary Social Welfare Committee and member of the Danish Socialist 
People’s Party in Jyllandsposten, 21 September 2000). Historically, the creation, 
design, and reform of the welfare state is predominantly a national concern.
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Is it possible, however, that increased European cooperation in the future will 
change the Nordic welfare model? Until recently the typical arguments to support 
this are those of social tourism, political integration and social dumping. Today 
these are supplemented with discussions of the need and desirability of the EU to 
regulate and coordinate macro-economic policies, see section on Financial crisis 
below. It goes without saying that it is impossible to do research on something 
that has not happened but, on the basis of recent developments, one can make a 
qualified guess. “Social tourism” from a Nordic perspective takes place when non-
Nordic citizens of the EU flock to Scandinavia to profit from the universal social 
benefits. They are assumed to come primarily from Southern Europe, and from 
the newer EU countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The movements of EU 
citizens between countries in the EU primarily comprise wage earners. They are 
covered by EU legislation on the coordination of the social rights of migrant 
workers. Briefly, this means that, for example, a Swedish worker in Denmark 
earns the right to social benefits on a par with a Danish wage earner (the 
principle of non-discrimination), and that he/she can take these rights along to 
other countries (the principle of the export of rights). Correspondingly, a Dane 
who has earned the right to, say, old age benefits in Germany can bring them 
home and have them paid out with entitlement to Danish benefits (the principle 
of accumulation) from one public authority (the principle of one competent 
agency).
As in clockwork, the individual cogwheels – the social arrangements – can 
interact even though they do not look the same. What is more, through their work 
in a Nordic country, non-national EU citizens contribute to its welfare system. For 
instance, they pay about one billion kronor (1 Euro approximately equals 7.45 
Danish kronor) annually to the Danish welfare society, after deduction of the 
welfare benefits they have drawn. Since non-Nordic employees are typically better 
insured economically in their homelands, it is probably motives other than 
speculation on tax-benefit rules that have led them to move northwards, such as 
partners or employers.
The movements of EU citizens and the coordination of social benefits are thus 
no threat to the Nordic welfare model. On the contrary, given the need for more 
workers in the future (see below), it is desirable to attract more employees from 
the other EU countries to Scandinavia.
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There are likewise no signs that the EU is taking over responsibility for 
welfare policy through increased political integration. Over and above the fact 
that there is still a distinct Nordic welfare model, despite many years of economic 
cooperation with the establishment of the single market, there is nothing to 
suggest that any ceiling will be set to the level and generosity of social benefits. 
The Council of Ministers has introduced only one minimum directive in the social 
sphere. It rules that all member states should give pregnant women paid leave to 
visit a doctor and maternity leave for at least 14 weeks, while the size of the 
maternity allowance is up to the individual country. In concrete terms this meant 
that Danish women gained paid leave for two visits to the doctor and that 
Portuguese women received an extra half a week of statutory maternity leave. 
This can hardly be called a fundamental change or harmonization of the social-
policy systems.
Minimum directives stipulate a floor that determines how low social benefits 
may be, but they do not impose any ceiling. It is possible that more of these 
minimum guidelines will be established in tandem with further enlargement, 
precisely to avoid social dumping inside the EU. The Nordic welfare benefits are 
generally of such as size and scope that there are no problems in meeting such 
minimum levels. These may, however, be a challenge to other EU countries, 
primarily in the south and east of Europe, but that is a different matter.
The fear of social dumping exists because EU countries compete. But social 
dumping has nothing to do directly with the EU although, as we have seen, it is a 
potential risk in a global economy. There will always be countries which can mass-
produce more cheaply than the Nordic countries as a result of lower wages and 
worse working conditions. History shows, however, that it is possible to have 
comprehensive welfare systems like the Nordic ones despite economic 
globalization. The question is therefore how the welfare society can meet 
challenges from globalization, and especially ensure a large and competitive 
workforce. This is something to be considered in the next section.
A changing labour market
Women’s entry into the labour market was perhaps the greatest Nordic revolution 
in the twentieth century. Whereas women in the past tended to have part-time 
jobs, there is now a significant shift to full-time jobs. Today this development has 
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gone further in Scandinavia and in certain Anglo-Saxon countries than in the 
Continental European countries. However, it may be just a matter of time before 
the women of Continental Europe also enter the labour market to the same extent 
as in the other countries, since the younger generations do not have the same 
traditions and values as older people. Whether this development is driven by 
desire or necessity is difficult to determine, but part of the reason for the greater 
participation of Nordic women in the labour market is to be found in the welfare 
state. To begin with, women often have jobs in the social, health, and education 
sectors, so the welfare state in Scandinavia may be seen as an important 
employer (Kolberg 1991). Secondly, women who have traditionally been 
responsible for caring now have better opportunities to combine work with family 
life thanks to extensive services for children and old people. In other words, the 
Nordic welfare model contributes both to a large range of available jobs and to 
high fertility rates.
The scope of child care, for example, expanded significantly even in the 1990s 
(Kvist 2000). Today no less than nine out of ten Danish children between the ages 
of three and six are in child care, a figure followed by Sweden with eight out of 
ten, Norway with three out of four, and Finland with seven out of ten. About six 
out of ten French children are in some form of subsidized child care, followed by 
the United Kingdom and Germany with about two out of five children, whereas 
only about one out of four Dutch children between three and six is in publicly 
subsidized child care. In other words, the Nordic welfare model does not face great 
demands for expansion in the light of women’s participation in the labour market.
Globalization and technological development require a flexible and qualified 
workforce. To avoid a mismatch between the demand for work and the actual 
supply of labour, the workforce must be reasonably well qualified and be in 
constant education in order to be able to fill the same and new jobs. Here the 
Nordic countries have an advantage by virtue of their traditions of free education 
for everyone and life-long training through extensive labour market training 
schemes and activation measures. This collective responsibility for maintaining 
human resources has no equal in the other welfare models, which are privatized 
to a greater extent. This is not to say that the Nordic countries should rest on 
their laurels, since the rapid development of society makes ever greater demands 
on the workforce and hence also on educational and labour market policy in a 
broad sense.
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Finally, the Nordic countries, like the other countries in the EU, are 
experiencing a change in labour market participation in different age groups. 
Young people are entering the labour market later, as they have a longer 
education to qualify them for the increased demands on labour. This is positive, 
since a lack of education also entails the risk of marginalization from the labour 
market.
The changing family
Historically speaking, the predominant family type in all Western European 
countries consisted of a man and a woman who were married “until death us do 
part”, with the man as the main breadwinner for his wife and several children. 
This has changed, not least in Scandinavia, where a two-earner model has become 
predominant as women entered the official labour market. In a Continental 
European country like the Netherlands, by way of contrast, there is talk of a 
switch to a 1.5 family model, meaning that women are in the labour market, in 
part-time jobs with a relatively small number of hours a week.
Earning their own money gives women power in relation to men and better 
opportunities to break out of unhappy partnerships. That is part of the reason for 
the increased number of divorces, and it has become more common not to have the 
same partner all through life. At the same time, women’s increased power also 
means a more reciprocal dependence between the partners. In other words, the 
man is more dependent on his female partner being in work.
Increased prosperity, new norms and opportunities for birth control and 
abortion have meant that the number of children per family has fallen all over 
Western Europe. Today the fertility rate is actually higher in Northern Europe 
than in Southern Europe. One reason is that it is easier to combine family and 
working life in Scandinavia than in many other countries because of extensive 
publicly subsidized care for old people and children. In short, Nordic women do 
not have to make the same choice as their Continental European sisters of 
whether to pursue a career or start a family: they can do both.
There are more people today who live in several different types of families 
than 30 years ago. There is a particular growth in the share of single earners and 
broken families (OECD 2911(. The spread of formerly atypical families is often 
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seen as an expression of the transition from a traditional to a modern or 
postmodern society, characterized by individualization and diversity. The 
challenge for the welfare models is to make it possible to live in different types of 
families without this having undesired economic and social costs.
To the extent that family development is universal but perhaps follows 
different timing, the Nordic welfare model has some advantages. Because of the 
high degree of individualization in the Nordic welfare model, comprehensive child 
care, and active state involvement in ensuring high employment, virtually all 
groups have a chance to survive economically today, whatever the type of family. 
This can be compared with the gender-discriminating Continental European 
model, which favours insiders and traditional family structures, and the Anglo-
Saxon model, which does not actively support different family types. In this 
sphere, the challenges are thus greater for the other European welfare models 
than for the Nordic one (see also Esping-Andersen 2009). The consequences of this 
can be that Nordic families have greater freedom of choice than families in most 
other European countries, and – in the longer term – the Nordic welfare society is 
more viable than that in Eastern and Southern Europe, which is a ticking 
demographic bomb with ageing populations and insufficient reproduction.
Changing demographics
The greatest challenge to Western welfare societies concerns the changing age 
composition of the populations. In the last 25 years, the number of people over 
retirement age (65) in Scandinavia has grown by 1.3 million, while the population 
of active working age (between 15 and 65) has grown by 1.4 million (Eurostat 
1999). For this reason, ageing populations have not hitherto been an economic or 
social challenge to the Nordic welfare societies. Because of lower fertility and 
longer life expectancy, however, they will soon face great challenges. In the next 
25 years a further 1.9 million people will be over pension age, whereas there will 
be about 8.1 million fewer people of active working age (UN 1999). The pressure 
on those of active age will thus increase, and it will be reinforced by the fact that 
younger people of working age enter the labour market later than before and the 
older ones leave it earlier. In other words, the share of people who have to be 
provided for is growing, while the share of providers is decreasing.
In addition to this, we do not know whether the “extra” years of life for future 
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elderly will be good years or bad years with a need to draw on social and health 
benefits. In any case, the generation of 1968 will undoubtedly become an 
important pressure group with powerful resources. They will make strong 
demands on the use of new technical advances, which will result in increased 
costs.
The composition of the population will also change in a different way, namely 
with the growth of multicultural societies. The Nordic welfare society is 
characterized by a high degree of ethnic homogeneity compared to countries with 
other welfare models. This will probably continue to be the case for many years to 
come. For example, only 4.6% of the Danish population today has a non-Danish 
ethnic background, yet ethnic minorities are often discussed as a problem, even 
though their age profile and relativity low employment are in fact one of the 
possible means to ensure the labour supply in the future.
The ageing of the population poses a series of challenges to welfare societies. 
The primary need is to maximize the number of people in active employment 
among the part of the population that is of working age. In other words, all those 
who can work must work. It is thus necessary to reduce the opportunities to 
withdraw early from the labour market with state support. It is also necessary to 
continue to prioritize measures to ensure that other groups, including the present 
generations of children and young people, can gain or keep their foothold on the 
labour market, not just for their own sake, but also for the old people of the 
future. In addition, the welfare state is facing recruitment problems due to the 
greater need for care for the elderly and the smaller number of people in working 
age. Better opportunities for further education of social workers is one means to 
attract and retain labour, to avoid dead-end jobs, to avoid wearing people out, and 
– albeit on a limited scale – to increase productivity and the quality of services. 
Compared with the other welfare models, the Nordic model has a relatively well 
developed system of care for older people, but a great deal can still be done to 
improve the quality of social work.
Old and new social problems
Combating poverty is the first duty of any society. Poverty among old people was 
the greatest challenge in the past, but now it is virtually eradicated both inside 
and outside Scandinavia (Pedersen 1999). Poor people who get married or find 
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work often escape poverty, which means that the widespread two-earner model 
and high employment, among single people as well, is part of the explanation for 
the relatively low level of poverty in Scandinavia. In addition, Nordic social 
security benefits are relatively generous by international standards for low-
income groups as they aim to ensure that everyone can take part in a “normal” 
life. The levelling out of inequalities between different groups based on social 
class, gender, ethnicity, region, age, and so on has been the main task of the 
Nordic welfare model. In the future it will be even more important to avoid the 
reinforcement of social inequalities. Everyone must be assured opportunities to 
optimize their human resources, and no one should be trapped in unemployment, 
bad jobs (either wages or content), or social problems. A certain degree of 
inequality at a given point in time is acceptable, but it should not be the same 
people who remain unable to realize their life chances, such as being part of a 
family and participating in the local community, the labour market, and politics.
Research into living conditions in Scandinavia has shown time and again 
that class matters - the so-called law of social inheritance, means that parents’ 
social circumstances are usually passed on to their children (e.g. Fritzell 1999). 
For example, children from less privileged families tend to be less privileged as 
adults. In other words, health problems, unemployment, and other social problems 
systematically show an uneven distribution. To counteract the negative sides of 
this requires early and comprehensive intervention in the living conditions of 
children and young people. This includes having a good range of care and 
education for everyone, and special arrangements for families with heavy 
burdens. The Nordic welfare model has a greater tradition of public intervention 
in family life than the other models, yet social problems are still unevenly 
distributed. This strengthens the case for continued expansion and improvement 
of measures on behalf of disadvantaged families and children. This need is 
reinforced by greater demands on tomorrow’s workforce. If all today’s children and 
young people are to be tomorrow’s providers, rather than needing to be provided 
for, then Scandinavian welfare policies also need new thinking and resources.
The popularity of the welfare state
Insufficient support for the welfare state has traditionally been regarded as a 
significant challenge. Numerous opinion polls have shown, however, that the 
Nordic populations support their welfare states (Goul Andersen et al. 1999). In 
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practice, the support for the welfare state is shown in the use of social benefits 
and the payment of high taxes. Today it is therefore rather the popularity of the 
welfare state that is the greatest challenge (Petersen 1996). The population 
seemingly has an insatiable need for public welfare and persistently demands 
more and better benefits. The problem arises when a growing share of the 
population seeks to take out as much and to contribute as little as possible. When 
it becomes “smart” or rational not to show solidarity, and “when only the naive 
and the stupid are left, the system has burst” (Andersen 1984).
This should be seen in the light of the changes in welfare policy in the last 50 
years. Whereas politicians could formerly take the credit for constant expansions 
and improvements of various arrangements, today they have to take the blame for 
changes which perhaps improve the situation for some, but make it worse for 
others. This is difficult for politicians who seek re-election. Established welfare 
schemes often have a number of powerful interest groups attached to them in the 
form of recipients, interest organizations, and providers of benefits. These groups 
cry out when they lose advantages, whereas potential groups of recipients are 
rarely conscious of their interests or organized to the same extent (see also 
Pierson 1996). Today’s politicians are in a tight corner. They can choose to 
camouflage changes of priority and restructuring of the welfare state by means of 
decentralization and technicalities, so-called obfuscation, or they can stand up 
and argue for their – often unpopular – choices.
Nordic politicians are nevertheless in a better position than their European 
counterparts, thanks to some distinctive features of the Nordic model. First of all, 
the Nordic countries, whatever their source of finance (social security 
contributions or taxes), have a tradition of far-reaching state intervention, unlike 
countries with a strong insurance tradition, whether private insurance or social 
insurance. In non-Nordic countries the paid-in contributions are perceived as 
resulting in well-earned rights having the character of private property rights 
which politicians are not allowed to touch. Moreover, a greater share of welfare is 
publicly financed in Scandinavia than in countries with an Anglo-Saxon model. 
This means that the public authorities, that is the politicians, have both greater 
responsibility and potential possibilities to influence the provision and financing 
of welfare in a Nordic model.
The tradition of state intervention and the relatively large public financing 
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thus makes the Nordic welfare model flexible in relation to that of other 
countries. This was evident in the 1990s, when Nordic politicians were more able 
than their counterparts to reform their welfare systems (Kuhnle 2000; Kautto et 
al. 2001). The extensive Swedish and Finnish cutbacks at the start of the 1990s 
showed solidarity in a period of recession, whereas experiences from the mid 
-990s to the mid-2000s show that periods of economic upswings allow qualitative 
changes of existing arrangements, as exemplified in the greater emphasis on 
activation and its interaction with cash unemployment benefits (Hvinden et al. 
2001; Clasen et al. 2001; Kvist et al 2012). The question remains whether Nordic 
and other European politicians will get on the wrong side of large groups of voters 
by meeting the challenges described above, with ageing populations, early 
retirement, new and old social problems as well as responding to the financial 
crisis.
The global financial crisis
The current global financial crisis also affects the Nordic countries and their 
welfare model, but later and perhaps to a less extent than in countries with other 
welfare models. The start of the financial crisis can be dated to August 2007 when 
the major French bank, BNP Paribas, announced that it did not know how much 
it had lost on the American market. However, it took a little more than a year 
before the crisis hit the shores of the Nordic countries. In the Autumn of 2008, 
economic fortunes rapidly reversed. For example, unemployment rose from record 
low 1.4 percentage in Denmark in October 2008 to 3.8 percentage in June 2009. 
Measured by unemployment, it can be seen, however, that the crisis has hit with 
varying impact that does not follow the welfare models depicted earlier. Based on 
comparable data for June 2009 the unemployment percentage rates were 9.5 in 
the US, 9.0 in Sweden, 8.5 in Finland, 7.7 in Germany, 6.3 in Denmark and 3.1 in 
Norway (Eurostat 2009).
However, there is a big difference between becoming unemployed in the Nordic 
countries and in the other European countries, not to mention the US. In general 
access to benefits for unemployed is more open in the Nordic countries than 
elsewhere. At the same time, more measures are taken to help persons back into 
employment and to deter ablebodied persons from drawing benefits.
The political responses to the financial crisis differ across the Nordic countries 
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making it difficult to talk about a common Nordic response. All countries have 
introduced so-called financial packages, but only Norway has to a larger extent 
also put in place traditional public relief work to stimulate the economy in old 
Keynesian style. Denmark and Sweden in contrast have introduced tax reforms 
that may help to spur demand, but also abroad, and where equity concerns are 
less pronounced. However, in no Nordic country is there moves towards a 
dismantlement of the national welfare model due to the adverse economic 
situation posed by the global financial crisis. Thus, the Nordic welfare model is 
most likely to survive also this external shock.
Concluding remarks
The greatest challenges to the Nordic welfare model concern changes in the age 
composition of the population, changing skill demands on the labour market and 
the financial crisis. The ageing of the population because of lower fertility, 
individual ageing with greater longevity, and changed labour market 
participation of age groups together mean that the proportion of people in 
employment will fall after 2010. Economically speaking the answer is obvious. As 
many people as possible who can work must do so. And only a reversal of the 
tendency towards early retirement can prevent or reduce the fall in employment 
to any significant extent. Countries outside Scandinavia, moreover, have the 
ability to raise women’s employment, which is called “the Nordic solution”, in the 
form of, for example, extensive subsidized child care. From this point of view, the 
Nordic welfare model is not a heavy millstone weighing down the economy. Rather 
the Nordic welfare model is a viable and - largely – popular idea in a time with a 
need for more earners. Especially women should not be unnecessarily long away 
from the labour market to look after family members who are young, sick, or 
elderly.
The changes in the labour market, in families, and in demographics are not 
just a matter of economic sustainability, but also of ensuring the social viability. 
This makes new, complex, and varied demands on social work in particular. 
Specialization and (further) education of social workers will also be crucial in the 
future so that, for example, ethnic minorities will be integrated in society and the 
labour market in Scandinavia; All families and children will have the best 
possible conditions for fulfilling their human potential irrespective of family 
status or resources; and care for the elderly will be of good quality. Social work 
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occupies a key role in ensuring efficiency and social solidarity in tomorrow’s 
society. At the same time, social work also plays a major role in ensuring the 
continued support for the Nordic welfare model. Only if everyone, including the 
middle class, is satisfied with the quality of, say, care for the elderly, is it possible 
to preserve a Nordic model with a major role for the state. Alternatively, if the 
middle class is not satisfied, there may follow a rise of private solutions on the 
market, and a polarization between the privileged with their own solutions to 
issues of welfare and the unprivileged with second-class public services. In the 
same way, good social work for ethnic minorities is crucial for the continued 
legitimacy of the welfare state, so that we can avoid a division into “us” and 
“them”.
The major question is whether politicians are prepared to give greater 
priority to social work and services for children, young people, the unemployed, 
ethnic minorities, and old people in times of permanent austerity and lack of 
labour. As we have seen, politicians have to face large pressure groups with well-
established rights to benefits such as early retirement and old-age pensions. But 
perhaps politicians will be forced to challenge them. When there are fewer people 
in active employment and greater needs for care and social work, education and 
better career opportunities are factors which can not only improve social work but 
also attract and retain the necessary workforce. In addition, the general societal 
development has meant a depletion in the politicians’ toolbox. The financial crisis 
means that politicians can no longer devalue and pursue expansive finance 
policies without a reaction from the international capital market. Social and 
labour market policy will therefore be one of the most important areas where 
national policy can make a difference.
Tomorrow’s social policy should be about investing in human resources which 
will help clients to become (re-)integrated in the labour market and in society. 
When social policy primarily consists of social security to inactive people, then it 
is harmful both for the welfare society and for the individuals it is trying to help. 
Measures should be reprioritized, from older to younger generations and from 
transfers to services. In relation to the other welfare models, the Nordic model is 
in a good position. It is relatively inclusive and gives most citizens the 
opportunity to use their capacity. Perhaps it is not so surprising, then, that the 
bumble bee can fly. And it can keep on doing so, if Nordic politicians and 
populations dare and wish it to.
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